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Optimal Abuse of Power 
Adrian Vermeule
* 
 
“[L]iberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses of power.”  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison) 
 
“That power might be abused, was, to persons of this opinion, a conclusive argument against its 
being bestowed; and they seemed firmly persuaded that the cradle of the constitution would be 
the grave of republican liberty.” 
5 JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 131 (1807) 
 
  I hope to restate, from a somewhat different angle, my objections to a particular way of 
looking  at  constitutional  and  institutional  design.
1 On  this  view,  which  I  call  precautionary 
constitutionalism,
2 the  master  aim  of  constitutional  design  is  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  power. 
Precautionary constitutional theory is haunted by the prospect that some official, somewhere, 
might commit abuses. Now different strands of precautionary constitutionalism define “abuse” 
differently. Abuse may be defined in legal terms, as action that flagrantly transgresses the bounds 
of constitutional or statutory authorization, or in welfare-economic terms as action that produces 
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* John H. Watson Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. An ancestor of this paper was presented under the title 
“Optimal Misrule” at a conference at Harvard Law School on March 3, 2014, on JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST 
MISRULE: JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS (2013). Thanks to Elster and the other conference participants for helpful 
comments on that occasion. Thanks to May Chow for excellent research assistance. 
1 The objections are set out in ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK (2014). 
2 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 27–51. 2 
welfare losses, either because officials have ill-formed beliefs
3 or because they act with self-
interested  motivations.  My  objections  apply  equally  to  all  these  versions  and  so  I  need  not 
specify any one of them in particular. 
In the modern administrative state, there are three major problems that undermine the 
precautionary view. The first and most obvious problem is that it is excessively costly to strictly 
minimize the abuse of power by government officials. Strict minimization is excessively costly 
both because it is costly to set up the enforcement machinery to prevent abuse, and because the 
enforcement machinery will itself be staffed by officials who may abuse their power in turn. 
Given these costs, the optimal level of abuse of power will be greater than zero. 
The second problem is that the goal of preventing official abuse trades off against the 
goal of producing the myriad of welfare goods that the administrative state supplies, such as 
poverty  relief,  health,  safety,  environmentalism,  and  consumer  protection.  Insofar  as 
constitutionalism takes a precautionary approach to the design of institutions, it is exposed to the 
same  problems—mutatis  mutandis—that  bedevil  precautionary  principles  in  first-order 
regulation  of  environmental,  health  and  safety  risks.  There  are  substitute  risks,  as  well  as 
tradeoffs across and among risks, on all sides of the relevant institutional questions.
4 
Put in general terms that cut across these policy areas, the largest tradeoff is that abuses 
of power can occur on both sides of the divide between “public” and “private” actions. The 
architects of the modern administrative state were not only worried about abuse of power by 
governmental  officials.  They  were  equally  worried  about  “private”  abuses—abuses  effected 
through the self-interested behavior of economic actors wielding delegated state power under the 
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3 By an “ill-formed belief,” I mean beliefs that are either biased or that are of low quality, resting on insufficient 
information. 
4 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 58–72. 3 
rules  of  the  common  law  of  property,  tort,  and  contract,  and  under  corporate  law.
5 The 
administrative state thus trades off governmental and “private” abuse; it accepts increased risks 
of  official  abuse  and  distorted  decisionmaking  in  order  to  give  governmental  officials  more 
power to suppress “private” abuses, in order to increase the activity level of the government as a 
whole, and in order to give administrators sufficient information to combat the evils that arise in 
complex sectors of the economy. 
The third and final problem is that the great flowering of constitutional theory in the late 
18th century addressed institutions—principally elected legislatures, constituent assemblies, and 
juries—that together represent a “different world” from our own.
6 Our governments are, to a first 
approximation,  essentially  bureaucracies.  The  elaborate  body  of  18th-century  constitutional 
theory simply has little to say about bureaucracy in any form recognizable to us today; for the 
most part, it fails to speak to us where we are now, given how bureaucratized our government 
has become.  
The main reason for the transformation of our government into an administrative state is 
that the rate of change in the policy environment, especially in the economy, is much greater than 
in the late 18th century—so much greater that the state has been forced, willy-nilly, to speed up 
the  rate  of  policy  adjustment.  And  the  main  speeding-up  mechanism
7 has  been  ever-greater 
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5 “Private” abuse is misleading in a familiar sense: The common-law judges who make the relevant rules are 
themselves public actors, and the corporations and other economic actors who wield power under the rules may be 
seen as exercising delegated public power themselves. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a 
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON 
LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT, 1998. So put, the tradeoff is 
between abuse by government officials eo nomine on the one hand, and on the other actors exercising delegated 
power under the common-law regime—a more cumbrous formulation, which I will take to be summarized by the 
contrast between “public” and “private” abuse. 
6 JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS 13 (2013). 
7 For the distinction between speeding-up mechanisms and slowing-down mechanisms in institutional design, see 
Jon Elster, Comments on the Paper by Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 240 (2004). 4 
delegation to the executive branch, accepting the resulting risks of error and abuse. We inhabit a 
different world of policymaking than did the theorists of the 18th century. One of the main 
differences is that, for us, time is always of the essence, so institutions are forced to trade off the 
quality of policy against its timeliness.  
I will put these three points together and suggest that the modern administrative state, 
centered  on  a  bureaucratic  system  whose  scope  was  unimaginable  in  the  18th  century,  has 
sharply qualified the very goal of minimizing abuses of power. In the administrative state, the 
abuse  of  power  is  not  something  to  be  minimized,  but  rather  optimized.  An  administrative 
regime will tolerate a predictable level of abuse of power, as part of an optimal package solution 
– as the inevitable byproduct of attaining other ends that are desirable overall.  
Institutional design must consider margins beyond or in addition to the quality of beliefs 
that officials form and the quality of the actions they choose. The architects of the administrative 
state believed that a government that always forms undistorted judgments and always acts from 
welfare-maximizing motives, and that therefore never abuses its power, will do too little, do it 
too  amateurishly,  and  do  it  too  slowly.  Institutional  design  in  the  administrative  state,  must 
therefore  consider  the  pervasive  tradeoff  between  impartiality  and  expertise,  such  that  more 
informed  bureaucrats  systematically  tend  to  have  agendas  or  stakes  that  threaten  their 
impartiality; must consider the activity level or output level of governmental institutions; and 
must consider the rate of policy adjustment. Hence administrative law constantly trades off the 
ideal  of  undistorted  decisionmaking  against  the  activity  level,  expertise,  and  speed  of  the 
bureaucracy. Moreover, the sheer costs of constitutional enforcement ensure that some positive 
rate of abuse is inevitable, at least in the practical sense that it would be unthinkable to spend the 
resources or to create the institutional structure needed to reduce official abuses to zero. Given 5 
all these reasons, the administrative state constantly gropes towards arrangements that embody 
an optimal abuse of power.  
Section A addresses enforcement costs, Section B addresses the threat of “private” abuse 
of  power,  and  Section  C  addresses  the  rate  of  policy  adjustment.  Section  D  examines  an 
important recent attempt by Jeremy Waldron to justify a classical version of the separation of 
powers; I will suggest that the justification must fail in the administrative state. In Section E, I 
will suggest—perhaps contra an ambiguous discussion by Jon Elster—that the goal of optimizing 
abuse of power is a coherent one, despite our inevitable uncertainty about where the optimum 
lies. 
A. Enforcement Costs 
Whatever  the  constitutional  and  institutional  rules,  the  costs  of  enforcement—of 
preventing official abuses—will inevitably be positive. The problem is two-fold. More obviously, 
the costs necessary to produce full enforcement of constitutional rules might simply not be worth 
paying, in light of other possible uses for those resources. It might take a large percentage of 
GDP to eliminate all official abuses whatsoever, leaving too little for the actual functioning of 
government and for the welfare goods that government supplies. I return to that issue shortly. 
Somewhat  less  obviously,  eliminating  abuses  requires  setting  up  an  enforcement 
machinery that is itself a source of possible abuses. In order to police officials who may abuse 
their powers, one must set up a new cadre of monitors—such as Inspectors General, prosecutors, 
or  judges,  or  all  of  these—who  may  proceed  to  commit  abuses  in  their  turn.  The  resulting 
question, “Who guards the guardians?”, has a neat answer in principle: The guardians must be 6 
arranged in a circle of mutual monitoring.
8 But the necessary institutional arrangements produce 
costs of their own, as the circle of mutual monitoring inevitably operates with a certain degree of 
friction, disagreement, conflict and delay.  
The upshot is that given positive costs of enforcing constitutional rules, some level of 
official abuse of power will be inevitable. In a thin second-best sense, it will even be desirable: 
insofar as there is no feasible improvement, no alternative regime that would do better. A certain 
level of abuse of power will necessarily be part of the best overall package solution to the 
problems of constitutional design.  
B. “Private” Abuse of Power 
  Let me turn now to a more complex issue: the abuse of power by nongovernmental actors, 
wielding delegated legal powers under general common law rules or under corporate law. James 
Landis  argued,  in  his  1938  Storrs  Lectures
9—along  the  lines  of  Berle  and  Means’  1932 
manifesto
10 —that  increased  economic  interdependence,  the  sheer  density  of  economic 
interactions,  had  generated  “pressure  for  efficiency”
11  that  in  turn  generated  massive 
corporations. These corporations represent “concentrations of power on a scale that beggars the 
ambitions of the Stuarts.”
12 In spheres dominated by the lords of capital, there is an absence of 
“equal  economic  power”
13 between  corporation  and  individual.  The  consequence  is  that  the 
“umpire theory of administering law is almost certain to fail . . . . [G]overnment tends to offer its 
aid to a claimant . . . because the atmosphere and conditions created by an accumulation of such 
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8 Leo Hurwicz, “But Who Will Guard the Guardians?”, Nobel Prize Lecture, Stockholm University (Dec. 8, 2007). 
9 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) (hereinafter LANDIS, ADMIN. PROCESS). 
10 ADOLF BERLE AND GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
11 LANDIS, ADMIN. PROCESS, supra note 9, at 46. 
12 LANDIS, ADMIN. PROCESS, supra note 9, at 46.  
13 LANDIS, ADMIN. PROCESS, supra note 9, at 36. 7 
unredressed claims is of itself a serious social threat.”
14 The administrative state, whose defining 
feature is tribunals exercising active and ongoing supervision rather than reactive common-law 
adjudication,
15 is necessary to redress this imbalance of economic power.  
  Conditional on creating a tribunal with active, supervisory regulatory jurisdiction, which 
form should the tribunal take? Here emerges Landis’s famous argument for the combination of 
powers or functions in agencies—the fusion of legislative, executive and judicial powers. The 
late 18th century was anxious to keep these powers apart, as a fundamental precaution against 
abuse. Landis argues by contrast that “[i]f in private life we were to organize a unit for the 
operation  of  an  industry,  it  would  scarcely  follow  Montesquieu’s  lines.”
16 The  form  of  the 
agency must follow the form of the concentrated entities it regulates.  
This is not simply magical thinking, although there may be a dash of that. Rather, the 
point is that the supervisory character of the agency’s role implies that it will be performing the 
same sort of tasks as the entities it regulates; it is thus “intelligent realism” for government to 
adopt a functionally similar form.
17 The imperative is to counterbalance concentrated corporate 
power by means of expert supervisory agencies; this imperative dictates not only the scope of 
regulatory jurisdiction, but also the organizational form for exercising that jurisdiction. That 
form sharply qualifies a central, classical precaution against abuse—the separation of powers—
in order to ensure an adequate level of information and an adequate activity level on the part of 
official bodies charged with countervailing private power. Although Landis is too much the 
politician to say this explicitly, the structure of the argument necessarily implies some degree of 
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14 Id. 
15 LANDIS, ADMIN. PROCESS, supra note 9, at 22–23. 
16 LANDIS, ADMIN. PROCESS, supra note 9, at 10. 
17 LANDIS, ADMIN. PROCESS, supra note 9, at 11–12. 8 
official  blundering,  even  abuse  of  power,  as  the  anticipated,  necessary,  and  unavoidable 
byproduct of a level of governmental information and vigor that is desirable overall. 
  Let  me  offer  two  illustrations  within  contemporary  administrative  law:  first,  the 
combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, and second, the combination of the 
power to make law with the power to interpret law. A central topic of administrative law is the 
combination  of  functions  in  bureaucracies  and  agencies—the  brute  fact,  which  horrifies 
separation-of-powers traditionalists, that agencies quite often combine the powers to legislate 
binding  rules,  to  enforce  the  rules  through  the  prosecution  of  complaints,  and  to  adjudicate 
whether the rules have been violated. Shockingly, the Federal Trade Commission (to choose only 
one example) may legislate rules about unfair competition, within the bounds of its statutory 
delegation from Congress; authorize its legal staff to file a complaint that alleges a violation of 
the rules; and then, rapidly switching its hat, assume the mantle of judge and hear and decide the 
complaint  that  it  has  caused  its  own  creatures  to  prosecute.  What  could  possibly  make  this 
constitutional? What happened to venerable maxims like “no man shall be judge in his own 
cause”?
18 And what of all the decisional distortions that such a scheme risks—most obviously, 
self-serving bias, as well as the reputational cost that a decisionmaker would pay by finding 
invalid a complaint that the decisionmaker itself had put forward? 
In a case called Withrow v. Larkin,
19 the Supreme Court recognized all these institutional 
risks,  yet  upheld  the  combination  of  agency  functions,  essentially  on  the  ground  that  the 
administrative state could not go on otherwise. The legal challenge in the case was brought under 
the constitutional provision that prohibits deprivation of “life, liberty or property without due 
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18 For a critique, see Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 122 YALE L.J. 
384 (2012). 
19 421 U.S. 35 (1975). 9 
process of law”;
20 the claim was that due process forbids a biased tribunal, and that a tribunal 
that combines prosecutorial with adjudicative functions must be a biased tribunal. Surely, the 
complaining party said, there is an intolerable risk of biased decisionmaking when the same 
decisionmaker who lodges the charges is also the one who decides (at least in the first instance) 
whether those charges are correct. The pattern is typical for the cases; the central harm that flows 
from  violation  of  the  classical  separation  of  functions  is  thought  to  be  a  distortion  of 
decisionmaking. 
The  Court,  however,  said  that  the  principle  of  separation  of  functions,  such  as  the 
functions of law-execution and judging, was too much of a straitjacket to be tolerable in the 
administrative state. “[T]he growth, variety, and complexity of the administrative processes have 
made any one solution highly unlikely . . . . The incredible variety of administrative mechanisms 
in this country will not yield to any single organizing principle.”
21 In other words, were the 
principle  of  separation  of  powers  to  be  enforced,  too  much  of  the  vast  and  heterogeneous 
administrative  state  would  have  to  be  jettisoned—an  intolerable  result,  given  everything  the 
administrative state does.  
Withrow v. Larkin built on an earlier case, FTC v. Cement Institute,
22 that had upheld a 
similar combination of functions in the FTC itself. The case involved monopoly price-fixing in a 
regulated industry—exactly the sort of “private” abuse of market power that is a central concern 
of the regulatory state. The regulated firms complained that the structure of the FTC, which 
combined investigative functions with adjudicative ones, was an affront to the separation of 
powers and to due process, because of the risk of a biased tribunal.  
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20 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
21 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. at 51–52. 
22 333 U.S. 683 (1948). 10 
With  either  stunning  naïveté  or  a  sophisticated  faux-naïveté,  the  Court  rejected  the 
constitutional challenge on the ground that the complaining party’s “position, if sustained, would 
to  a  large  extent  defeat  the  congressional  purposes  which  prompted  passage  of  the  Trade 
Commission  Act.”
23 Both  expertise  and  activity  levels  were  at  issue.  As  to  expertise, 
investigation of the industry by the same Commissioners who would judge violations was a 
feature, not a bug; the experience gained through those investigations would be the necessary 
precondition for the commissioners to form genuine expertise in the trade practices they are 
charged  with  regulating.
24 As  to  activity  levels,  requiring  a  separation  of  prosecution  from 
judging would disqualify the entire membership of the Commission, with the result that “this 
complaint could not have been acted upon by the Commission or by any other government 
agency.”
25 To  the  Court,  in  other  words,  it  seemed  intolerable  that  government  should  be 
forbidden to act against monopolistic distortions of the market—against the “private” abuse of 
power—even  if  the  price  of  avoiding  that  intolerable  passivity  of  government  would  be 
predictable distortions of governmental decisionmaking.  
The  Constitution,  then,  does  not  generally  require  a  separation  of  prosecution  from 
judging. But statutes may; I have simplified the legal situation a bit by leaving that out. In fact, 
the Administrative Procedure Act creates another layer of complication that illustrates how the 
administrative  state  gropes  towards  optimal  tradeoffs  between  and  among  institutional  risks. 
When the Federal Trade Commission’s lawyers file a formal complaint against a firm, the first 
adjudicator to decide the case will not be the Commission itself. Rather there will be an initial, 
formal adjudication on the record, conducted by an official called an “administrative law judge” 
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23 FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 701. 
24 FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 702. 
25 FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 701. 11 
(ALJ), with an appeal lying from that decision to the Commission itself. The ALJ emphatically 
does  not  combine  prosecutorial  functions  with  adjudicative  functions,  and  the  ALJ  has  no 
legislative rulemaking functions either. Rather, the Administrative Procedure Act puts into place 
a set of protections for the independence and disinterestedness of the ALJs, who may neither 
prosecute themselves nor be subject to the supervision of the prosecuting staff.
26 But the Act 
exempts from those strictures the agency itself,
27 meaning (in the case of the FTC) the top-level 
commissioners, who review and may reverse the decisions of the ALJs. 
Consider the odd patchwork of rules that results: Functions are separated at the lowest 
level  of  the  agency,  but  only  for  formal  adjudication  on  the  record,  not  for  either  informal 
adjudication or the agency’s legislative rulemaking functions. And in any event, when the case is 
appealed to the top level of the agency—the level of the commissioners themselves—there is no 
separation  of  functions  at  all.  This  patchwork  is  clearly  an  equilibrium  compromise—the 
Supreme Court has described it as such
28—that trades off competing considerations, involving 
the risks of biased decisionmaking on the one hand and on the other the risks of insufficient 
activity levels and insufficient expertise. It seems unlikely that the compromise is optimal in any 
strong sense, but historically it was designed to protect multiple values, each to some degree but 
none fully, and in that weaker sense has an optimizing character. 
  So far I have discussed the combination of prosecutorial with adjudicative functions, but 
there  is  also  the  recurring  issue  of  the  combination  of  lawmaking  with  law-interpretation. 
Agencies often do both things, to the horror of separation-of-powers devotees. Here, the classical 
worry about abuse of power is not so much a worry about cognitive distortion as it is about 
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26 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 60 Stat. 237, § 5(c), 5 U.S.C. § 554(d). 
27 APA, 60 Stat. 237 § 5(c), 5 U.S.C. § 554 (d)(2)(C). 
28 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40–41 (1950). 12 
motivational distortion: A decisionmaker who knows that it will have license to interpret the very 
same laws it creates will have incentives to write vague laws in order to maximize its own 
interpretive discretion farther downstream.
29  
The modern Supreme Court, however, largely ignores this concern (with the exception of 
Justice Scalia, and the possible exception of two others)
30; in fact, it not only allows agencies to 
interpret the legislative rules agencies themselves create, but also  holds that judges have to defer 
to  the  agencies  about  what  those  rules  mean.
31 The  Court  does  that  because  it  believes  that 
agencies have special expertise about the meaning of the rules they themselves have created, 
and—even more importantly—because interpretation is not cleanly separable from policymaking, 
so that the power to interpret the rules is a necessary component of the agency’s policymaking 
expertise with respect to the given problem or industry.  
This is essentially to accept a tradeoff. The Court has never said that the motivational 
distortion posited by the classical separation of powers is not a real one; what it seems to think is 
that the costs in distorted incentives are worth paying in light of the benefits to policymaking by 
expert agencies. In other words, a certain risk of abuse is tolerable in the service of overall 
institutional gains. 
C. Rate of Adjustment 
  I turn now to the third principal point. Holding constant the institutional variables we 
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29 This is a Lockean theme. See John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, ch. 7, §§ 91, 94, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT: AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003) 138–39, 140–41; Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 180, 239 (J.H. Brumfitt & John C. Hall 
eds., G.D.H. Cole trans. 1973) (1762). 
30 See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (arguing against deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations); id. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., and 
Alito, J., concurring) (suggesting “serious questions” about the practice, but reserving judgment for later cases). 
31 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 13 
have already discussed, there is a separate question about the rate at which governmental policy 
adjusts over time, as the rate of change in the economic and policy environment itself changes. 
Here I follow William Scheuerman’s insight
32 that the engine of the administrative state is the 
increasing rate of change in the policy environment, relative to any baseline we choose. That is, 
the rate of change in the economy, technology, and so on, was plausibly greater in 2000 than in 
1900, and greater in 1900 than in 1800. 
Legislative  institutions  are  structurally  incapable  of  supplying  policy  change  at  the 
necessary rates, a point made by students of constitutional law as radically dissimilar as Chief 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone
33 and Carl Schmitt.
34 The veto-gates, second, third and nth opinions,
35 
and interbranch checks and balances that—in a Madisonian system—are intended to promote 
reasoned deliberation and launder out passion and interest, together ensure that legislatures will 
“come too late”
36 to the resolution of an increasing fraction of policy problems. To some extent, 
legislatures may solve the problem by internal specialization, through an ever-more-elaborate 
committee  system  and  an  ever-larger  staff.  But  there  is  an  upper  bound  to  the  capacity  of 
legislative  institutions  to  do  this;  the  constraint  arises  from  the  increasing  complexity  of 
legislative institutions as they are scaled up, and the increasing transaction costs of conducting 
legislative business. The U.S. Congress has gone about as far as it is possible to go in this regard, 
with its 20,000-odd employees and staff, dozens of principal committees and more than a gross 
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32 WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME (2004). 
33 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944) (Stone, C.J.) (upholding delegation to administrative agency of 
price-control authority, on the ground that “[t]he Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government 
does not demand the impossible or the impracticable. It does not require that Congress find for itself every fact upon 
which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed determinations which it has declared to be 
prerequisite to the application of the legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress 
itself properly to investigate.”). 
34 CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY (Ellen Kennedy trans., 1985); William E. 
Scheuerman, The Economic State of Emergency, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1869 (2000). 
35 On second opinions in institutional design, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK ch. 5 (2014). 
36 See Scheuerman, The Economic State of Emergency, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1869, 1887 n. 56. 14 
of subcommittees. Even so, Congress’s agenda is so radically compacted and constrained that it 
is routine for critical policy problems to languish indefinitely on the congressional docket, even 
as extant law becomes risibly maladapted to the relevant problems as the policy environment 
changes over time. 
Under the pressure of necessity, three institutional developments occur in tandem. First, 
Congress’s main response to the increasing rate of change in the policy environment is ever-
increasing delegation to the executive and to independent agencies. Second, courts defer ever 
more strongly to agencies, who are better positioned than courts to update policy under obsolete 
statutes, in a world in which Congress had increasingly abdicated its policy responsibilities.
37 
And, third, the executive itself expands its own power of unilateral action,
38 exploiting broad and 
vague delegations, vague constitutional powers, and traditional pockets of discretion, such as 
power over prosecution and enforcement, in order to change policies without going to Congress 
for statutory authorization.  
Constitutional  law’s  main  response  to  these  developments,  after  an  initial  period  of 
resistance, has been to get out of the way. In the United States, judicial resistance to delegation 
began  in  earnest  in  1935
39 and  ended,  at  the  latest,  in  1944.
40 Judicial  deference  to  agency 
interpretations of law is not constitutionally problematic; The reigning justification, however 
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37 See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming  __ 2014), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2393033; Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? 
Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013 (1998). 
38 Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 132 
(1999). 
39 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 288 (1935); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495 (1935). 
40 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). For a sweeping recent restatement of congressional power to 
delegate, see Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 15 
fictional  it  may  be,  is  that  Congress  itself  intends  for  such  deference  to  occur.
41 Unilateral 
presidential action has occasionally been invalidated if it goes very far,
42 but for the most part it 
has become the routine stuff of government in the United States. Consider that President Obama, 
having failed to obtain a liberalization of the immigration laws from Congress (the “DREAM 
Act”), instituted roughly the same policy merely by announcing a very broad policy of deliberate 
non-enforcement of the extant immigration statutes.
43 
The cause or consequence of all this is a tradeoff. In a simple model, broader and looser 
delegation,  with  fewer  veto-gates  or  checks  and  balances,  allows  the  executive  to  put  new 
beneficial policies in place more easily, while also allowing more expropriation—more abuse of 
delegated power.
44 As the rate of change in the policy environment increases, the benefits of 
loosening the constraints on new executive action increase, despite the greater risk of abuse. The 
basic approach is to justify abuses of power as the unavoidable byproduct of a package solution 
that is increasingly desirable overall, as the rate of policy change increases. 
The  point  is  fractal;  it  holds  in  the  same  form  at  whatever  scale  we  examine  the 
administrative state. Once delegating statutes are in place, the law faces the question of how 
costly it should be for agencies to adjust or update policies within the scope of their delegated 
authority. In the 1960s and 1970s, judges pioneered a form of scrutiny of administrative action 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
41 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
42 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
43 Letter of Law Professors to President Obama, Re: Executive Authority to Grant Administrative Relief for 
DREAM Act Beneficiaries (May 28, 2012), available at 
http://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/documents/ExecutiveAuthorityForDREAMRelief28May2012withSignatures.pdf; 
Alejandro Mayorkas, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: Who Can be Considered, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG 
Aug. 15, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/08/15/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-who-can-be-
considered; Brad Plumer, Can Obama Legalize 11 Million Immigrants on his Own?, WASH. POST Nov. 14, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/11/14/can-obama-legalize-11-million-immigrants-on-
his-own/.  
44 Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, & Francesco Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, 119 Q.J. ECON. 565, 
575 (2004) 16 
called  “hard  look  review,”  under  which  courts  would  scrutinize  the  justifications  agencies 
offered for their policy choices, assessing both the procedural rationality and the substantive 
plausibility  of  those  justifications.
45 Critics  complained  that  hard  look  review  resulted  in 
“ossification,”  or  excessive  legal  drag  on  agencies’  ability  to  update  policies  with  changing 
circumstances.
46  
Empirically, it isn’t clear that ossification is a real problem.
47 Nonetheless, in recent years, 
the Supreme Court has courageously dealt this possibly imaginary problem several powerful 
blows, through decisions that in effect reduce legal constraints on agencies’ ability to update 
policies  over  time—even  if  the  result  is  that  agency  policymaking  is  less  reasoned,  more 
arbitrary.
48 An  example  is  Federal  Communications  Commission  v.  Fox,
49 in  which  the 
Commission moved to a new, more restrictive set of rules governing broadcasting of expletives 
or indecent content. The problem (in stylized form) was that although the Commission had given 
a set of reasons to justify the new policy, it had not given any reasons to think that the new 
policy was better than the old one. The Court, however, held that the law’s ban on “arbitrary and 
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45 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc., v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
46 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986); Note, 
Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the Fact, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1909 (2009); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts 
and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997). 
47 There is a growing literature. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the 
OssificationThesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1414 (2012); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and 
Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-making “Ossified”?, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 261 (2010); 
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 
94 VA. L. REV. 889, 963–966 (2008); William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 393 (2000).  
48 In addition to the example in text, see, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 
967 (2005) (allowing agencies to change their interpretations of ambiguous statutes over time, even if doing so 
effectively nullifies a pre-existing judicial decision). 
49 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 17 
capricious”  decisionmaking  by  agencies
50 was  not  violated  by  failure  to  compare  past  and 
present policies; all that the agency has to give is a good reason for its current position. 
Now  this  is  not  obviously  consistent  with  agencies’  fundamental  obligation  to  make 
reasoned decisions. At least in static contexts, where the options do not change over time, and 
where the costs and benefits of the options are known (at least in expectation), comparative 
policy  evaluation  seems  a  minimum  necessary  condition  of  rationality.  In  this  sort  of  static 
context, “satisficing” -- settling for something good enough
51 -- is irrational; why not pick the 
best option, the one with the highest expected value? If the value of the options is known, at least 
in expectation, it is irrational to say, “I have good reasons to pick A, so it doesn’t matter that B is 
even better.”
52  
To be sure, in Fox itself, the policy context of the case at hand involved uncertainty, and 
under uncertainty satisficing can be a rational approach.
53 Agencies do frequently operate in 
uncertain, dynamic environments in which search for the best policy is costly and must somehow 
be truncated; satisficing is one way to do so. But the problem is that the Court’s opinion is 
completely insensitive to these distinctions; Fox does not limit its holding in this way. A more 
convincing  account  of  Fox  is  that  the  Court  was  worried  about  granting  a  new  license  for 
ossification. Allowing parties to force agencies to perform comparative policy evaluation, on 
pain of judicial reversal, would allow regulated actors to delay agency action, to gum up the 
works  through  harassing  litigation,  even  more  than  they  already  do.  Allowing  agencies  to 
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50 APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 
51 Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1955); MICHAEL SLOTE, BEYOND 
OPTIMIZING: A STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (1989). 
52 David Schmidtz, Satisficing as a Humanly Rational Strategy, in SATISFICING AND MAXIMIZING: MORAL 
THEORISTS ON PRACTICAL REASON 30, 39 (Michael Byron ed., 2004).  
53 Simon, supra note 51, emphasizes that satisficing is a rational strategy in dynamic environments, in which the 
decisionmaker must place limits on the search for new options or new information about options.  18 
satisfice, even in contexts where satisficing is not obviously a rational course, removes one 
margin—the margin of comparative policy evaluation—on which regulated entities may press in 
order to thwart and delay the course of policymaking. The tradeoff, in other words, is that the 
Court is willing to accept a degree of irrational satisficing in agency decisionmaking in the 
interests  of  unclogging  the  channels  of  administrative  change.  Put  differently,  in  the  real 
institutional setting of the administrative state, a requirement of fully rational decisionmaking by 
officials may be exploited by self-interested private groups for socially harmful ends. Thus the 
tradeoff between the rationality of policymaking and its speed is, in part, another instance of the 
tradeoff  between  “public”  and  “private”  abuse  of  power  that  is  so  fundamental  to  the 
administrative state. 
D. Waldron on the Separation of Powers and the Separation of Functions 
  Having laid out the main line of the argument, let me examine an important challenge to 
it.  I  have  suggested  that  the  separation  of  powers  has  been  deeply  compromised  by  the 
administrative state, and for good reasons. However, not everyone agrees that the compromise is 
desirable. Jeremy Waldron offers us a late flower of classical constitutional thought—a deeply 
considered parsing of the notion of separation of powers, one that aims to distinguish it from 
neighboring notions like checks and balances, and to isolate and identify its inherent value.
54 
Waldron’s argument is not precautionary. His point is not that the separation of powers is a 
useful prophylactic against the abuse of power. Nonetheless I have to address it, because if his 
argument is correct, then the separation of powers has a special inherent value that ought not to 
be tossed into the soup of institutional tradeoffs. But I think that his argument is incorrect, and 
indeed that it is idolatrous; it makes the classical separation of powers into an implacable idol, 
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54 See Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice, 54 B.C. L. REV. 433, 460–2 (2013). 19 
deaf to all other considerations and to all other goods. 
Waldron  acknowledges  that  the  separation  of  powers  may  not,  in  the  United  States 
anyway, have the status of an enforceable legal norm.
55 The Constitution’s text does not mention 
it as such, and it is hardly obvious that a freestanding principle of the separation of powers may 
validly be inferred from the larger constitutional structure.
56 But Waldron observes rightly that 
even if the separation of powers lacks legal force, it may still have force as a principle of our 
constitutional culture—a political ideal in the high constitutional sense.
57  
The principle of separation of powers, Waldron argues, has value that is conceptually 
distinct from the values underpinning checks and balances, the division of powers, or even the 
rule  of  law.  The  value  underpinning  separation  of  powers  is  respect  for  “the  character  and 
distinctiveness of each of the three main functions of government.”
58 Rather than collapse all 
official decisionmaking into an undifferentiated mass, as in the dictates of a khadi or monarch, it 
is  desirable  that  there  should  be  “articulated  government  through  successive  phases  of 
governance each of which maintains its own integrity.”
59 Power must flow through differentiated 
institutions; “[t]he legislature, the judiciary, and the executive—each must have its separate say 
before power impacts on the individual.”
60 
  Why isn’t this tautological? If powers should be separated because there is a value to 
institutions with differentiated and distinctive powers having a “separate say,” isn’t this to say 
that powers should be separated because there is a value to the separation? Waldron does not 
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55 Waldron, supra note 53, at 436–38. 
56 John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1944–45 (2011). 
57 Waldron, supra note 53, at 436–37. 
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appeal to the functional consequences of such differentiation; his argument is not that (or is only 
incidentally that) separating powers produces institutional benefits, such as slower decisions or 
better decisions. That sort of justification would implicate the countervailing considerations and 
tradeoffs  I  have  detailed.  Rather,  Waldron  is  looking  for  something  more  conceptual,  more 
enduring.  He  speaks  in  the  language  of  the  sacred,  the  language  of  “integrity”  and 
“contamination”: 
The Separation of Powers Principle holds that these respective tasks have, each of them, 
an  integrity  of  their  own,  which  is  contaminated  when  executive  or  judicial 
considerations affect the way in which legislation is carried out, which is contaminated 
when  legislative  and  executive  considerations  affect  the  way  the  judicial  function  is 
performed,  and  which  is  contaminated  when  the  tasks  specific  to  the  executive  are 
tangled up with the tasks of law-making and adjudication.
61 
The idea seems to be that functionally separated decisionmaking has an intrinsic or inherent 
value from the standpoint of political morality. But it is not clear that Waldron has identified any 
such value in terms that are distinct from merely describing the separation itself, albeit with a 
normative glow drawn around it in Waldron’s palette of brilliant colors. Furthermore, it is not 
obvious that what are, after all, merely institutional arrangements could ever be the sorts of 
things that could be “contaminated,” even in principle. The language of the sacred is simply 
misplaced  as  to  such  matters  of  institutional  design.  Waldron  has  made  a  particular,  highly 
contingent institutional pattern, the classical separation of powers, into a kind of idol whose 
commands trump any other consideration. 
  Let us put all this aside, however. Suppose that Waldron’s justification manages to avoid 
tautology; suppose that the justification stands independently of the thing to be justified. An 
entirely separate question is the level at which the justification is supposed to operate. For clarity, 
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let us refer to the separation of powers at the constitutional level and the separation of functions 
at the administrative level.  
In the administrative state, the great bulk of rulemaking is accomplished by legislative 
delegation of power to agencies, which then make rules while exercising combined functions, in 
whole or in part. Waldron clearly wants to condemn this in principle,
62 but it is not obvious that 
it should pose any problem for him. If the delegating statute itself has been deliberated by the 
legislature, approved by the executive, and reviewed for constitutionality by the judiciary, why 
hasn’t the force of the separation-of-powers principle at the constitutional level been entirely 
exhausted? When the agency then exercises its (combined) functions as authorized by that statute, 
it is true that “[t]he legislature, the executive, the judiciary—each [has had] its separate say 
before power impacts on the individual.”
63 It is unclear, then, why Waldron should object to 
delegation of power to agencies or to the agencies’ exercise of combined functions under a 
delegation, even granting everything in his argument. 
  It is not as though the issue is novel. The Justices, to their credit, considered these issues 
long ago, in the second round of the epic, defining litigation that goes by the name of SEC v. 
Chenery Corp.
64—what administrative lawyers call “Chenery II.” The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), through adjudication, formulated an administrative order and applied it to 
the parties at hand, rejecting their proposal for a corporate reorganization as inconsistent with a 
general statutory requirement of “fair and equitable” action. Justice Jackson, taking Waldron’s 
part in dissent, protested vehemently against the “retroactivity” of the Commission’s approach. 
In  Jackson’s  view,  rather  than  applying  its  order  to  the  parties  in  the  case  at  hand,  the 
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Commission ought to have first formulated a legislative-type rule applying solely prospectively, 
and only then proceeded to enforce it and adjudicate future violations. (This would have required 
letting the inequity in the case at hand go unredressed). Jackson, in other words, argued for 
separation  of  functions  at  the  agency  level,  not  merely  separation  of  powers  at  the  level  of 
Congress, the President and the judiciary.  
Waldron clearly wants this as well.
65 But the Chenery II Court thought that Jackson’s 
dissent, which no other Justice joined, was overheated—inebriated by an excessive intake of 
principle. Although the Court agreed that “quasi-legislative promulgation” of prospective rules 
should occur “as much as possible,” it rejected any “rigid requirement” to that effect.
66 Instead, 
the Court offered a famously nuanced and level-headed analysis of the circumstances under 
which separation of functions, and Waldron’s preferred sequence of general rulemaking followed 
by specific application, might actually make impossible the execution of the very delegation with 
which the agency had been entrusted: 
[P]roblems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not reasonably 
foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule. Or 
the agency may not have had sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant 
rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be so 
specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of 
a  general  rule.  In  those  situations,  the  agency  must  retain  power  to  deal  with  the 
problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective. There is 
thus a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards. And the 
choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one 
that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.
67 
 
The sentence I have emphasized explains the problem with holding that separation of functions is 
required at the administrative level. At the higher level of statutory lawmaking, Congress, the 
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President and the judiciary have engaged in just the sort of reticulated, deliberative lawmaking 
process that Waldron wants; they have converged on a policy; and they have decided that the 
agency is best positioned to implement it. That decision—which must itself have unimpeachable 
credentials,  on  Waldron’s  view—will  be  thwarted  if  there  must  also  be  rigid  separation  of 
functions at the level of the agency, for all the practical reasons the Court gives. Where those 
circumstances obtain, two levels of separation is a pragmatically inconsistent arrangement, on 
Waldron’s own premises.  
The point is not that pragmatics override principle. Rather the separation of functions at 
the  second,  lower  level  has  to  give  way,  precisely  in  order  that  the  principled,  properly 
differentiated decisions reached at the higher level of statutory enactment and delegation may be 
given real life. In that sense, the administrative state must partially jettison the separation of 
administrative functions in order to carry out the larger purposes of the separation of powers. The 
form and the function of separation of trade off against one another at higher and lower levels, 
and some sort of compromise—ideally an optimal compromise—must be effected between them. 
The Administrative Procedure Act and the rules of administrative law, which give agencies a 
great deal of latitude to combine functions, are best viewed as an effort to achieve an optimal 
compromise of this kind. 
E. Optimal Abuse of Power? 
  Finally,  let  me  tie  up  a  loose  end.  I  have  been  casually  throwing  around  the  phrase 
“optimal abuse of power.” How much conceptual and philosophical baggage is stuffed inside 
that phrase? Not too much, in my view. There is a pragmatic construal that makes perfect sense 
of optimization in this setting, a construal which fully recognizes the practical and epistemic 24 
difficulties that arise from grave uncertainty about where the optimum may lie. 
To focus the issues, let me quote a brief discussion of optimizing institutional design by 
Jon Elster. Elster’s view is skeptical, but—I believe—gives me everything I need to make the 
sort of claims I have advanced here. Elster says the following: 
[C]iting  the  need  to  find  an  “optimal  compromise”  between,  say,  expertise  and 
impartiality  is  to  presuppose  that  we  can  determine  the  trade-off  between  these  two 
values.  One  might  affirm,  for  instance,  that  the  benefits  from  learning  created  by 
extending the tenure of rotating officials from one year to two years exceed the costs 
arising from the risk of capture. Similarly, one might affirm that the benefits of a two-
terms-only  rule  for  deputies  exceed  the  costs.  It  follows  from  my  general  argument, 
however, that such claims will in general be unsustainable. They assume that we have a 
normative theory of what constitutes a good outcome and a causal theory of how to bring 
it about by institutional means. The present work as a whole is directed against this 
assumption.  
This being said, it would be absurd to be dogmatic on this issue. In some cases where a 
proposed reform would entail costs as well as benefits, one can confidently claim that the 
net effect will be positive. Examples include the abolition of life tenure for judges (an 
American practice created when life expectancies were less than half of what they are 
today) or of annual elections to Parliament (also a practice that may have made sense in 
the  18th  century  but  not  in  the  21st).  By  contrast,  the  merits  of  triennial  versus 
quadrennial elections or of six-year versus eight-year tenure for judges on constitutional 
courts seem entirely indeterminate.
68 
 
Elster here lays out all I need to motivate the thin and undemanding sense of optimality that I use. 
If there exist cases in which we can be confident that the net benefits of an institutional reform 
would be positive, then we must have some common currency or metric—call it “welfare” if you 
like—by which to compare the costs and the benefits. Moreover, sometimes (not always or 
necessarily) we will have a sense of the sign of moves from the status quo—that is, whether we 
are moving in the right direction or the wrong direction within the space of possible institutional 
designs, where “the right direction” is toward the point at which no further net-beneficial moves 
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will be possible. But if and when we have a sense of those things, there is nothing incoherent 
about calling ourselves “optimizers” in the following thin sense: We keep making incremental 
net-beneficial moves within the institutional space just up until the point at which the net benefits 
from further moves have diminished to zero—to the point where marginal benefits and costs are 
equal, or roughly equal as far as we can tell.  
True, we might well run out of information at some point. It might just be irreducibly 
unclear  whether  another  small  move  in  the  institutional  space  will  produce  incremental  net 
benefits. Moreover, even if we are confident that further small moves will indeed produce no 
more net benefits, that might just mean that we have arrived at a local maximum, a local peak of 
welfare, rather than a global maximum, the highest peak or “optimum” in a strong sense.
69 If so, 
then small moves might not help, but large leaps would, if only we knew which way to leap. 
To pursue Elster’s example, faced with a tradeoff between impartiality and expertise, 
suppose we fiddle with the length of officials’ terms or the frequency of elections in the search 
for net benefits. We might encounter a wall of uncertainty, a veil of ignorance, such that we have 
no idea whether another change to the official term or some other fiddle in the same direction is a 
good idea. More seriously, even if we come to rest, thinking we have reached a peak, the true 
global optimum might actually be reached by a large leap—perhaps switching to a radically 
different system for selecting officials altogether, such as the system of selection by lot used in 
the ancient city-states. Who knows?  
But none of this is to deny the coherence of the optimizing enterprise. It is just to say that 
optimizing under conditions of uncertainty is hard. The problem is informational, not conceptual. 
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The  optimizing  approach  is  pragmatic,  contingent  and  epistemic.  If  we  think  we  can  make 
incremental improving moves from wherever we happen to start, then we are aiming for some 
optimum, while acknowledging that under uncertainty we may never quite know when or if we 
have arrived. 
Conclusion 
The administrative state faces inevitable tradeoffs among the classical institutional goal 
of reducing official abuse of power, the presence of positive costs of enforcing the constitutional 
rules, the regulatory goal of reducing “private” abuse of power, and a myriad of substantive 
welfarist  goals.  Its  response—by  fits  and  starts,  and  with  all  sorts  of  cross-cutting  political 
agendas and compromises—has been to grope towards a set of arrangements that tolerate a 
certain amount of official abuse as the unavoidable byproduct of a package solution that achieves 
the other aims of the administrative state. One doesn’t know, of course, whether the rules of the 
administrative state are optimal in the strong sense that they reach a global welfare maximum. 
But there is no doubt that the architects of the administrative state were, in some cases anyway, 
searching  for  net  institutional  improvements  in  the  face  of  the  relevant  tradeoffs,  and  thus 
intentionally optimizing -- albeit locally, in my weak sense. “Optimal abuse of power,” then, is 
just  a  shorthand  for  the  distance  we  have  had  to  travel  away  from  the  classical  ideal  of 
precautionary constitutional arrangements that strictly minimize the risks of bad government by 
public officials.  